Roger Williams University Law Review
Volume 21
Issue 2 Vol. 21: No. 2 (Spring 2016) Symposium on
Mass Incarceration

Article 7

Spring 2016

Between a Constitutional Rock and a Procedural
Hard Place: Placing Petitioners in an Eighth
Amendment Battle of Persuasion
Kelley E. Nobriga
J.D., Roger Williams University School of Law, 2016

Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
Recommended Citation
Nobriga, Kelley E. (2016) "Between a Constitutional Rock and a Procedural Hard Place: Placing Petitioners in an Eighth Amendment
Battle of Persuasion," Roger Williams University Law Review: Vol. 21: Iss. 2, Article 7.
Available at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol21/iss2/7

This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Roger Williams University Law Review by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.

NOBRIGA FINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/21/2016 8:02 PM

Between a Constitutional Rock and a
Procedural Hard Place: Placing
Petitioners in an Eighth Amendment
Battle of Persuasion
Kelley E. Nobriga*
INTRODUCTION

In 1608, Captain George Kendall was the first person
executed in the United States.1 Since his death, citizens of the
United States have been executed in pursuit of retribution and
deterrence.2 It is now, centuries after Captain Kendall’s death
that a more modern society is starting to ask tough questions in
the face of old school thought. What happens when the desire for
revenge fades after the prisoner spends decades on death row?
What is the solution when arbitrary sentences diminish the
purported penological purpose of death by state? Or simply, what
happens when the death penalty no longer fits within society’s

* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 2016;
B.S., Roger Williams University, 2013. I would like to thank the members of
the Roger Williams University Law Review for their diligent edits during the
drafting process, especially Casey Charkowick for encouraging me to keep
writing and Sarah Driscoll for telling me that it is okay to stop. I would also
like to extend my gratitude to Professor Emily Sack for her insightful
comments. To my mom, sisters and grandparents, I am eternally grateful for
your love and support. Lastly, thank you to Nicholas Resendes for not only
inspiring me to attend, but also for accompanying me to, the United States
Supreme Court for the Glossip v. Gross oral arguments.
1. Introduction to the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/part-i-history-death-penalty (last visited Feb. 25,
2016).
2. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2767 (2015).
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standard of decency?
The real issue though is not what questions are being asked,
but rather what answers are being given. This Comment does not
focus on the constitutionality of the death penalty per se, but
rather on how the death penalty is implemented and the standard
that the Supreme Court developed for evaluating a method’s
constitutionality. It will explore this controversial dialogue in the
aftermath of the Supreme Court’s most recent decision involving
capital punishment in Glossip v. Gross, which set forth the
requirement that petitioners, in order to challenge their states’
execution protocol, must first present an alternative method of
capital punishment to the court.3
This Comment begins with a brief introduction into the
history of the capital punishment methods. In Part I, this
Comment will summarize the Court’s decision in Baze v. Rees4
and the subsequent issues—both practical and procedural—that
have occurred as a result. On that groundwork, Part II will
discuss the unattainable standard set forth in Glossip. This
Comment will ultimately conclude that, under the Glossip
standard, petitioners are closed off from seeking relief in court
unless they somehow have insight into new, less painful methods
of execution.
Absent human experimentation or scientific
discoveries, death row petitioners are burdened with a battle of
persuasion that they likely will never win.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF EXECUTION METHODS AND STANDARDS

In 1897, a total of forty-eight states and territories used
hanging as their primary execution method.5 New York was the
first state to use electrocution as its method of capital punishment
seven years earlier.6 Although electrocution was the preferred
method of execution for almost a century, other methods, such as
the firing squad, were also in use.7
3. Id. at 2739.
4. 553 U.S. 35 (2008).
5. Deborah Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82
IOWA L. REV. 319, 364 (1997).
6. See Baze, 553 U.S. at 42. Eleven states joined by 1915. See id.
7. Id.; see also Brief for the Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics at
Fordham University School of Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 4, Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015) (No. 14-7955)
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When Oklahoma introduced lethal injection legislation in
1977, it quickly became the dominant method of execution in the
United States.8 The original protocol called for a three-drug
combination: thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium
chloride.9 In response to the introduction of this seemingly more
humane method, thirty-seven other states quickly adopted
Oklahoma’s protocol without any independent testing of their
own.10 This practice of quick decision-making became a trend
that ultimately resulted in a 2008 challenge to Kentucky’s lethal
injection protocol that reached the Supreme Court—a protocol
similar to that implemented by Oklahoma forty-one years earlier.
It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court “has never
invalidated a [s]tate’s chosen procedure for carrying out a
sentence of death as the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment,”11 and each new method has been designed to be
more humane, at least in theory.12
Prior to 2008, however, the Court upheld previous methods of
execution as constitutional, and ultimately developed a working
standard for Eighth Amendment challenges.13 For example, the
Court in Wilkerson v. Utah held that, while the firing squad was
not cruel and unusual, certain punishments that involved
“unnecessary cruelty” would be.14 Expanding on that standard in
1890, the Court defined cruel punishments in In re Kemmler as
[hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief] (“With the exception of a few states that
permitted use of the firing squad, the general historical trend in the United
States led to the transition from hanging to electrocution, which gave way
briefly to reliance on the gas chamber, before settling on lethal injection.”).
“In the 1880’s, the Legislature of the State of New York appointed a
commission to find ‘the most humane and practical method known to modern
science of carrying into effect the sentence of death in capital cases.’ The
commission recommended electrocution. . . .” Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2731–32
(quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 444 (1890)).
8. Baze, 553 U.S. at 42. Oklahoma began using lethal injection in 1977
using protocol with three drugs: First, sodium thiopental; second, a paralytic
agent; and third, potassium chloride. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2733.
9. See Eric Berger, Lethal Injection Secrecy and Eighth Amendment
Due Process, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1367, 1376 (2014).
10. Id. (“Instead, because it was easier to copy another state’s procedure
than to design a new one, state officials mimicked Oklahoma’s approach
without actually examining its benefits and risks.”).
11. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2732 (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 48).
12. Baze, 553 U.S. at 48.
13. See id.
14. 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878).
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those that “involve torture or a lingering death . . . [or] something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life.”15
II. BAZE STANDARD

In Baze v. Rees, the Supreme Court once again upheld an
execution method in the United States with regards to a lethal
injection protocol.16 The petitioners in Baze challenged the lethal
injection procedures in Kentucky after each were sentenced to
death.17 At the trial court level, certain findings of fact were
made in determining that the petitioner’s argument failed;
specifically, the trial court found that Kentucky’s procedures were
within the realm of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment.18
The central issue in Baze focused on what legal standard
should be used when evaluating the constitutionality of an
execution method.19 Rejecting the petitioner’s challenge, the
Court set forth additional standards to determine if a method of
execution is constitutional under the Eighth Amendment.20 The
question put forth to the Supreme Court of the United States was
whether Kentucky’s lethal injection procedures violated the
Eighth Amendment; ultimately, the Court held that it did not.21
A. Kentucky’s Protocol
At the time, Kentucky used a three-drug combination for its
lethal injection procedures: sodium thiopental, pancuronium
bromide, and potassium chloride.22 If the inmate was unconscious
from a proper administration of the first drug, it was undisputed
that he or she would not feel any pain or discomfort associated
with the effects of the second and third drugs, which has been

15. 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890).
16. 553 U.S. at 48.
17. Id. at 41.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 50–53.
20. Id. at 61.
21. Id. at 47.
22. Id. at 44. The first drug induced a “deep, comalike unconsciousness”
while pancuronium bromide, a paralytic that stops respiration, left the
inmate unable to move; lastly, potassium chloride stopped the heart. Id.
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described as the “chemical equivalent of being burned at the
stake.”23
Kentucky’s lethal injection statute provided that “every death
sentence shall be executed by continuous intravenous injection of
a substance or combination of substances sufficient to cause
death.”24 While the inmate could opt for death by electrocution,
the statute would default to lethal injection if the inmate failed to
make a decision within twenty days of the scheduled execution.25
The officials at the Kentucky Department of Corrections
developed the procedure for the execution.26 According to the
protocol, only personnel with at least one year of professional
experience were permitted to insert the intravenous injection (IV),
while a certified phlebotomist and an emergency medical
technician (EMT) administered other necessary venipunctures.27
Other potentially less qualified personnel, however, mixed the
chemicals and filled the syringes.28
In addition to the medical personal, the warden and deputy
warden would be present in the execution chambers, as they were
responsible for conducting a visual inspection of the inmate to
observe any signs of consciousness as well as issues with the IV
catheters.29 A physician was present at all times “to assist in any
effort to revive the prisoner in the event of a last-minute stay of
execution.”30 With the exception of verifying death, however, a
physician was prohibited from participating in the actual
23. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2781 (2015); see also Baze, 553 U.S.
at 44.
If properly administered, sodium thiopental “eliminates any
meaningful risk that a prisoner would experience pain from the subsequent
injections of pancuronium and potassium chloride.” Baze, 553 U.S. at 49.
24. Id. at 44–45; see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.220(1)(a) (West
2006).
25. See Baze, 553 U.S. at 45; see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.220(1)(b).
26. See Baze, 553 U.S. at 44–45. The procedure required 1 gram of
sodium thiopental, 50 milligrams of pancuronium bromide, and 240
milliequivalents of potassium chloride. See id. at 45. Between each injection,
25 milligrams of saline were injected to prevent any clogging from the
previous substance. Id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 45–46.
30. Id. at 46. It should also be noted that, at the time of this case,
Kentucky had only used the above lethal injection procedure on one prior
inmate, Eddie Lee Harper. Id. There were no issues reported in regards to
his execution procedure. Id.
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execution by the American Medical Association’s Code of Medical
Ethics.31
B. Petitioner’s Arguments in Baze
The petitioners argued that Kentucky’s lethal injection
procedures were unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment
due to the potential for maladministration of the lethal drugs and
the state’s failure to adhere to safer alternatives, as set forth by
petitioner.32 Moreover, the petitioners argued that Kentucky’s
lethal injection procedure created an unnecessary risk of pain.33
Recognizing that some level of pain is inherent in the lethal
injection process, petitioners argued that the Eighth Amendment
does not allow for the “unnecessary risk” of pain, and the Court
must evaluate “(a) the severity of pain risked, (b) the likelihood of
that pain occurring, and (c) the extent to which alternative means
are feasible, either by modifying existing execution procedures or
adopting alternative procedures.”34
The petitioners conceded, however, that, under normal
procedures, the process would be humane and constitutional
because the first drug would render the inmate insensitive to
pain.35 However, if the personnel improperly administered the
31. See Lee Black & Robert M. Sade, Lethal Injection and Physicians:
State Law vs Medical Ethics, 298 JAMA 2779, 2780, 2781 (2007).
32. Baze, 553 U.S. at 41.
33. Id. at 49. However, Kentucky urged the Court to use the same
“substantial risk” test that the circuit court used, which focused on the
likelihood of needless suffering. See id. at 48. For a claimant to succeed on
the claim, there “must be a ‘substantial risk of serious harm,’ an ‘objectively
intolerable risk of harm’ that prevents prison officials from pleading that they
were ‘subjectively blameless for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.’” Id. at
50 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842, 846 & n.9 (1994)). In this
analysis, a distinction is drawn between “a series of abortive attempts at
[execution],” “[a]ccidents . . . for which no man is to blame,” and “isolated
mishap[s].” Id. (quoting Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459,
462, 471 (1947)) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, multiple
incidents could constitute an intolerable risk of harm under the Eighth
Amendment. See id.; Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459,
471 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
34. Baze, 553 U.S at 47.
35. Id. at 49. The trial court, using the “substantial risk” test, found
that Kentucky’s procedures were within the realm of the Eighth
Amendment’s requirement against cruel and unusual punishment. See id. at
41. After the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed, petitioners filed a writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States questioning whether
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second drug, a paralytic, it would leave the inmate unable to
motion for help during what would be a painful administration of
the second and third drugs.36 The petitioners further argued that
the risk of such improper administration was high due to the
inadequacy of the protocol and inexperience of the staff.37 As an
alternative, the Baze petitioners suggested that the state use a
one-drug protocol that “dispenses with the use of pancuronium
[bromide] and potassium chloride.”38 The petitioners also argued
that Kentucky should be required to employ additional, trained
personnel to assist in the monitoring of consciousness.39
C. Respondent’s Arguments in Baze
In response, Kentucky urged the Court to use the “substantial
risk” test that was used at the time in the lower courts.40 Under
the test, the risk of pain must be “‘sure or very likely to cause
serious illness and needless suffering’ and give rise to ‘sufficiently
imminent dangers’” for the protocol to be considered substantially
risky.41 For a claimant to succeed under this high standard, there
“must be a ‘substantial risk of serious harm,’ an ‘objectively
intolerable risk of harm’ that prevents prison officials from
pleading that they were ‘subjectively blameless for purposes of the
Eighth Amendment.’”42

Kentucky’s lethal injection procedure violated the Eighth Amendment. See
id. The Court held that it did not. Id. at 49–51.
36.
See id. at 44. “First, Kentucky’s use of pancuronium bromide to
paralyze the inmate means he will not be able to scream after the second
drug is injected, no matter how much pain he is experiencing.” Id. at 122
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 54 (plurality opinion).
38. Id. at 51.
39. Id. The petitioners suggested that the personnel employ safeguards
to monitor consciousness, such as a sphygmomanometer or an
echocardiogram. Id. at 58–59.
40. Id. at 48; see, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 217 S.W.3d 207, 209 (Ky. 2006).
41. Baze, 553 U.S. at 50 (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33,
34–35 (1993)).
42. Id. at 50 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842, 846 & n.9
(1994)).
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D. Baze Standard Defined
1.

Plurality Opinion

Initially, the Court noted that, while the Eighth Amendment
prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, it “does not demand the
avoidance of all risk of pain in carrying out executions.”43 The
Court also distinguished between “a series of abortive attempts,”44
“[a]ccidents . . . for which no man is to blame,”45 and “isolated
mishap[s].”46
Multiple isolated incidents, however, could
constitute an “objectively intolerable risk of harm” under the
Eighth Amendment.47
The Court rejected petitioner’s argument and instead decided
to adopt the substantial risk standard announced in Farmer v.
Brennan.48 Under this test, an “alternative procedure must be
feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduce a
substantial risk of severe pain.”49 Notably, “a condemned prisoner
cannot successfully challenge a State’s method of execution merely
by showing a slightly or marginally safer alternative.”50 If a
petitioner were, however, able to meet this burden, and a state
refused to change its protocol in response, the protocol would
constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment.51
Applying the substantial risk analysis, the Court rejected the
43. Id. at 47.
44. Id.; see also Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 471
(1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (analyzing a hypothetical situation where
multiple “abortive attempts” could present different issues from the accident
at issue in Resweber).
45. See Resweber, 329 U.S. at 463 (holding that accidental situations in
execution procedures where malevolence is lacking does not constitute an
Eighth Amendment violation).
46. Baze, 553 U.S. at 50 (quoting Resweber, 329 U.S. at 462, 471)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
47. Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 846) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.”
48. Baze, 553 U.S. at 52.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 51. The Court found that permitting such an argument would
frustrate the legal system by requiring it to find “best practices” for
executions. Id.
51. Id. at 41.
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contention that Kentucky’s procedure was “objectively intolerable”
because thirty states (out of the thirty-six states then using lethal
injection), as well as the federal government, used the same threedrug sequence as Kentucky.52 Rather, the Court noted, “[n]o
State uses or has ever used the alternative one-drug protocol
belatedly urged by the petitioners.”53
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the petitioner’s challenge to
the protocol, including their request for additional personnel, on
the basis of viable alternatives because “the Eighth Amendment
[does not] require[] Kentucky to adopt the untested alternative
procedures petitioners have identified.”54 The Court ultimately
affirmed the lower court’s decision, concluding that Kentucky’s
lethal injection procedure was constitutional.55
2.

Concurrence by Justice Thomas

The concurring opinion by Justice Thomas, which Justice
Scalia joined, agreed that the petitioners failed to show that
Kentucky’s protocol violated the Eighth Amendment.56 However,
Justice Thomas disagreed with the plurality’s standard, and
instead argued that the inquiry should focus on whether the
method of execution is “deliberately designed to inflict pain.”57 He
noted that the Court has never held that an execution method
violated the Constitution simply because it involved pain,
“whether ‘substantial,’ ‘unnecessary,’ or ‘untoward,’” that could be
eliminated by adopting an alternative procedure.58 Rather,
methods of execution, such as burning at the stake and beheading,
are in violation of the Constitution if they are “designed to inflict
torture as a way of enhancing a death sentence . . . .”59
52. Id. at 53.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 54. The dissent argued that requiring “rough-and-ready tests,”
such as “calling the inmate’s name, brushing his [or her] eyelashes, or
presenting him [or her] with strong, noxious odors—could materially decrease
the risk of administering the second and third drugs before the sodium
thiopental has taken effect.” The Court rejected this, finding that the risk of
consciousness is only apparent if the first drug is not administered properly.
See id. at 60.
55. Id. at 41.
56. Id. at 94 (Thomas, J., concurring).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 101.
59. Id. at 102.

NOBRIGA FINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

THE BATTLE OF PERSUASION

4/21/2016 8:02 PM

379

Justice Thomas further stated that the Court has never
required additional safeguards for a procedure merely because
there was a possibility of a defect.60 In Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, for example, the Court held that Louisiana would not
violate the Constitution if it subjected an inmate to a second
electrocution after the first attempt was unsuccessful.61 In that
case, as Justice Thomas claimed, the state was not required to
“implement additional safeguards or alternative procedures in
order to reduce the risk of a second malfunction” unless the Court
found evidence of an intention to inflict unnecessary pain.62
Lastly, because the plurality did not give more guidance as to
what is considered “substantial,” or what reduced level of risk is
“significant,” Justice Thomas predicted that the lower courts
would struggle with the new, “unprecedented and unworkable
standard . . . .”63
3.

Dissenting Opinion

Disagreeing with the plurality opinion, Justice Ginsberg
argued that the true question was not only the adequacy of the
first drug, but also whether Kentucky’s procedures contained
sufficient safeguards to ensure that the sodium thiopental
rendered the inmate unconscious before the administration of the
last two drugs.64 Justice Ginsberg would have remanded the
matter to the lower courts to determine “whether the failure to
include readily available safeguards to confirm that the inmate is
unconscious after injection of sodium thiopental, in combination
with the other elements of Kentucky’s protocol, creates an
untoward, readily avoidable risk of inflicting severe and
unnecessary pain.”65
Initially, Justice Ginsburg discussed the ability of Kentucky’s
protocol to safeguard against harms caused by improper

60. Id. at 107.
61. See id. at 100 (citing 329 U.S. 459, 461 (1947)).
62. See id. at 103.
63. Id. at 106.
64. Id. at 114 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 123. Justice Ginsburg cited to other state protocols, noting
that many other procedures required closer attention to an inmate’s
consciousness than Kentucky’s protocol then provided. See id. at 119–21.
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administration.66 Even the petitioners conceded in their brief to
the Kentucky Supreme Court that “[t]he easiest and most obvious
way to ensure that an inmate is unconscious during an
execution . . . is to check for consciousness prior to injecting
pancuronium [bromide].”67 However, much like Justice Thomas’s
concurrence, Justice Ginsburg also argued that the plurality’s
standard would lead to uncertainty in the lower courts.68
III. POST-BAZE ISSUES

A stay of execution may not be granted on grounds such
as those asserted here unless the condemned prisoner
establishes that the State’s lethal injection protocol
creates a demonstrated risk of severe pain. He must
show that the risk is substantial when compared to the
known and available alternatives. A State with a lethal
injection protocol substantially similar to the protocol we
uphold today would not create a risk that meets this
standard.69
The Baze standard came into existence at a time where
known and available alternatives to lethal injection drugs
existed—a time where states had options in regards to doses and
chemicals. Shortly after the standard was announced, however,
the lethal injection landscape changed, calling the Baze standard
into question. Specifically, two aspects of the Baze standard were
challenged. First, clarification on the term “substantially similar”
when comparing alternative drugs, and second, what could a
petitioner do if he or she cannot provide the court with a known
alternative due to a drug shortage or unavailable scientific
testing?

66. Id. at 114. Justice Ginsburg cited to the Supreme Court decisions in
Wilkinson and In re Kemmler, noting that the Court “must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.” Id at 115–16 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–12
(2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
67. Id. at 123 (second alteration in original) (quoting Brief for Appellants
at 41, Baze v. Rees, 217 S.W.3d 207, 209 (Ky. 2006) (No. 2005-SC-00543))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
68. See id. at 117.
69. Id. at 61 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
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A. Questionable Decision-Makers and Protocols
One major issue with Baze was the uncertainty about what
language constituted its holding and standard. In Baze, there
were five concurring opinions from Justices Alito, Stevens, Scalia,
Thomas, and Breyer.70 Justice Ginsberg filed a dissenting
opinion, which was joined by Justice Souter.71 Chief Justice
Roberts announced the judgment of the Court, which Justices
Kennedy and Alito joined.72 As one court described the confusion:
“[T]he holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken
by those [m]embers who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds . . . .”73 As mentioned above, Justices Thomas
and Scalia disagreed with the holding that a substantial risk of
pain standard should be used and instead argued for an inquiry
into whether a method involved a deliberate and unnecessary risk
of pain.74 Therefore, it is unclear whether the majority of the
Court actually required that a petitioner prove that a particular
method has a substantial risk of pain when compared to a known
and available alternative.
Notably, soon after the Baze decision, sodium thiopental, the
first drug in Kentucky’s protocol, was removed from the market by
European manufacturers in an effort to protest capital
punishment in the United States.75 Without sodium thiopental,
many states were forced to find an alternative drug to induce

70. See Baze, 553 U.S. at 63, 71, 87, 94, 107 (concurring opinions).
71. See id. at 113 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
72. See id. at 35.
73. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. See id. at 94 (Thomas, J., concurring).
75. See Juergen Baetz, America’s Lethal Injection Drug Crisis Starts in
Europe, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 18, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.business
insider.com/americas-lethal-injection-drug-crisis-starts-in-europe-2014-2.
“The shortage of sodium thiopental led prison officials to seek out
questionable alternative sources of the drug throughout the world, ranging
from England to Pakistan.” Deborah Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos PostBaze, 102 GEO. L.J. 1331, 1361 (2014); see also Despite Drug Shortage, 2
States Carry on with Executions Using Single Dose of Potent Sedative, FOX
NEWS (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2014/08/04/despite-drugshortage-2-states-carry-on-with-executions-using-single-dose/; Erik Eckholm
& Katie Zezima, States Face Shortage of Key Lethal Injection Drug, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/us/22lethal.html.

NOBRIGA FINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/21/2016 8:02 PM

382 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:370
unconsciousness.76
1.

Quick Decisions

Because lethal injection drugs became scarce on the market,
some states were forced to find alternative drugs to carry out their
procedures.77
States sought out constitutionally adequate
alternative procedures that would not be considered cruel and
unusual punishment in light of the unavailability of known
methods.78
But how could states ensure that these new, alternative lethal
injection methods would actually serve the penological purpose
the states intended? The Director of the Death Penalty
Information Center responded that experimentation with
execution procedures could lead to “unexpected consequences,”
and found that some states have been “winging it.”79 Similarly, in
76. See, e.g., Chris McGreal, Lethal Injection Drug Production Ends in
the U.S., GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2011, 1:17 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2011/jan/23/lethal-injection-sodium-thiopental-hospira.
Again, the
Court in Baze held that a request for a stay of execution should be rejected
unless the prisoner can demonstrate a risk of substantial pain and prove that
there are known drug alternatives available.
Baze, 553 U.S. at 52.
Additionally, the challenge should be rejected if the drug(s) being challenged
is “substantially similar” to the protocol upheld in Baze; the true challenge
has become deciding what chemicals are substantially similar or what
combination is available in the face of a drug shortage. See id. at 61.
77. See, e.g., Missouri Execution Halted Over Fears of Drug Shortage,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 11, 2013, 2:17 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
oct/11/missouri-execution-halted-execution-drug-shortage (“Drug makers in
recent years have stopped selling potentially lethal pharmaceuticals to
prisons and corrections departments because they don’t want them used in
executions. That has left the nearly three dozen death penalty states,
including Missouri, scrambling for alternatives.”). Without an effective first
drug, the effects of the second and third drugs could rise to the level of
torture. See Denno, supra note 75, at 1361; Jeanne Whalen & Nathan
Koppel, Lundbeck Seeks to Curb Use of Drug in Executions, WALL ST. J.,
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230458400457641909267
5627536 (last updated July 1, 2011, 2:22 PM).
78. Mark Berman, The Recent History of States Contemplating Firing
Squads and Other Execution Methods, WASH. POST (May 22, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/05/22/the-recenthistory-of-states-contemplating-firing-squads-and-other-execution-methods/
(explaining that Virginia has been considering the electric chair, Missouri
has been considering the gas chamber, and Utah may reinstitute the firing
squad).
79. Tracy Connor, Firing Squad and Gas Chamber Closer to Reality in
Three States, NBC NEWS (Feb. 13, 2015, 7:18 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/
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her Glossip dissent seven years after Baze was decided, Justice
Sotomayor wrote about the painful consequences of an ineffective
first drug in a lethal injection protocol:
The latter two drugs are intended to paralyze the inmate
and stop his heart. But they do so in a torturous manner,
causing burning, searing pain. It is thus critical that the
first drug, midazolam, do what it is supposed to do, which
is to render and keep the inmate unconscious.80
Because the Baze plurality upheld Kentucky’s protocol, which
was created by correctional officers, it essentially set the
precedent that such officers—without prior education or
knowledge in the area of medicine or chemicals—were qualified to
choose the methods that the state would use to execute those on
death row. It follows then that “[n]o matter what lethal injection
statute a legislature has in place or how a court interprets that
statute, both legislatures and courts delegate the actual business
of executions to a department of corrections.”81
Each time a state implements a new lethal injection protocol,
it calls into question the method for choosing the particular drugs
that are devoid of a known testing procedure to ensure that the
protocol will induce its intended effect. This, in turn, raises the
following: How can a state ensure that its protocol will be
successful on prisoners without first engaging in human
experimentation? The prison officials who craft these execution
protocols and select the drugs do not have the requisite medical or
scientific backgrounds that would qualify them to make these
complicated determinations.82
As history demonstrates, states adopted lethal injection
generally and the three-drug protocol specifically without serious
study or independent analysis.
States uniformly followed
Oklahoma in delegating prison officials the details of lethal
injections. Contemporary evidence indicates that prison officials
likely lack the necessary expertise to develop lethal injection
storyline/lethal-injection/firing-squad-gas-chamber-closer-reality-three-states
-n305266.
80. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2780–81 (2015) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
81. Denno, supra note 75, at 1356.
82. See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 7, at 26.
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protocols and fail to rely upon scientific or medical study. Yet,
these prison officials, operating outside of the public eye, are
tasked with developing procedures by which inmates will be
executed.83
In the face of an uncertain “substantially similar” standard
and quick medical decisions made by those lacking medical
experience, states have struggled to find suitable alternatives for
their protocols. Conversely, petitioners have lacked an alternative
method to challenge these protocols, as they could not find known
or available drugs necessary to establish a claim—a requirement
that might not even had been required by the Baze plurality.
2.

Midazolam

The first alternative to sodium thiopental, pentobarbital, was
adopted by fourteen states and appeared to be effective.84
Pentobarbital, a strong barbiturate like sodium thiopental, is used
to euthanize animals of all sizes, ranging from rabbits to beached
whales.85 The Danish manufacturer, Lundbeck Inc., discontinued
supplying pentobarbital to facilities using its product for capital
punishment, expressing strong anti-death penalty sentiments.86
83. Id.
84. State by State Lethal Injection, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-lethal-injection (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).
But see Denno, supra note 75, at 1364 (“Like sodium thiopental,
pentobarbital’s effects are most difficult to measure when a state uses a
three-drug protocol because the subsequent paralytic agent (pancuronium
bromide) can mask the first drug’s effects.”). Oklahoma was the first state to
use pentobarbital in 2010. See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 7, at 22; see
also Jackson v. Danberg, 656 F.3d 157, 166 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that
substituting pentobarbital for sodium thiopental did not constitute a
substantial risk of pain); Pavatt v. Jones, 627 F.3d 1336, 1340 (10th Cir.
2010) (holding that pentobarbital was sufficient for inducing consciousness);
State by State Lethal Injection, supra.
85. Denise Grady, Three-Drug Protocol Persists for Lethal Injections,
Despite Ease of Using One, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2014, at A16.
86. See Whalen & Koppel, supra note 77. In a letter to Ohio Department
of Rehabilitation and Corrections, the President of Lundbeck, Inc. wrote of its
awareness that Ohio was using the drug for capital punishment purposes,
and stated it was “adamantly opposed” to such use. Letter from Staffan
Schuberg, President Lundbeck Inc., to Gary Mohr, Director Dept. of
Rehabilitation and Correction (Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/documents/LundbeckLeth Inj.pdf. Oklahoma also used pentobarbital for
its executions, but was unable to obtain the drug in March 2014. See Glossip
v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2782 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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However, midazolam eventually took pentobarbital’s place in the
lethal injection “cocktail.”87
Unlike sodium thiopental and pentobarbital, both powerful
barbiturates, midazolam is a benzodiazepine, which is used to
induce sleepiness, relieve anxiety, and, most commonly, treat
epilepsy.88 The Federal Drug Administration (FDA), however, has
not approved the use of midazolam as a sole anesthetic in medical
procedures.89 When used for lethal injection, midazolam is often
coupled with either one or two other drugs to form a potentially
deadly cocktail.90 States such as Oklahoma and Florida use
midazolam in a three-drug sequence with pancuronium bromide, a
paralytic, and potassium chloride.91 Alternatively, Ohio and
Arizona are known to use a two-drug procedure combining
midazolam with hydromorphone, a strong painkiller.92
Without adequate testing on humans, however, midazolam’s
effectiveness is ultimately unknown, and its use has led to
speculation about lethal injection and the death penalty as a
whole. For example, on January 16, 2014, Dennis McGuire was
executed in Ohio with both midazolam and hydromorphone.93
McGuire allegedly arched his back and clenched his fists during
the twenty-six minute execution, which raised concern about the
87. See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 7, at 23–24. Oklahoma
substituted midazolam for pentobarbital in 2014. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at
2733–34 (majority opinion).
88. Drugs and Supplements Midazolam (Injection Route), MAYO CLINIC,
http://www.mayoclinic.org/drugs-supplements/midazolam-injection-route/
description/drg-20064813 (last visited Feb. 19, 2016); see also Lesley K.
Humphries & Lea S. Eiland, Treatment of Acute Seizures: Is Intranasal
Midazolam a Viable Option?, J. PEDIATRIC PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS,
Apr.–Jun. 2013, at 79, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3668
946/pdf/i1551-6776-18-2-79.pdf; Ed Cara, What is Midazolam: Why Are
Doctors Worried the Lethal Injection Drug Won’t Sedate Death Row Inmates?,
MED. DAILY (Jun. 29, 2015, 7:35 PM), http://www.medicaldaily.com/whatmidazolam-why-are-doctors-worried-lethal-injection-drug-wont-sedate-deathrow-340468.
89. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2783 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
90. Lethal Injection, CAP. PUNISHMENT U.K., http://www.capitalpunish
mentuk.org/injection.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).
91. State by State Lethal Injection, supra note 84.
92. Id.
93. Tracy Connor, Ohio Says Controversial Execution of Dennis McGuire
Was ‘Humane’, NBC NEWS (Apr. 28, 2014, 9:34 PM), http://www.nbc
news.com/storyline/lethal-injection/ohio-says-controversial-execution-dennismcguire-was-humane-n91811.
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new drug combination.94 Later that same month, in Arizona,
Joseph Rudolph Wood was injected with the very same chemicals
in an execution that lasted one hour and fifty-seven minutes,
during which witnesses claimed to have seen Wood continually
gasping for air.95 Again, in April 2014, Clayton Lockett was
executed in Oklahoma during a procedure that lasted forty-three
minutes.96 After being declared unconscious, Lockett stated,
“something is wrong,” and “[t]he drugs aren’t working.”97
After an investigation, Oklahoma claimed that the failed
procedure was the result of an infiltrated IV, “which means that
‘the IV fluid, rather than entering Lockett’s blood stream, had
leaked into the tissue surrounding the IV access point.’”98
However, upon the release of Lockett’s autopsy results, it was
shown that the “concentration of midazolam in Lockett’s blood was
more than sufficient to render an average person unconscious.”99
Oklahoma’s response to the tense criticism was to increase the
dose of midazolam from 100 to 500 milligrams for future execution
procedures.100
Moreover, even the very experts who use midazolam on a
daily basis disagree with its use in lethal injection protocols.101
For example, Doctor Kent Diveley, an anesthesiologist in
California, was asked to review Dennis McGuire’s execution.102
He found that personnel administered only ten milligrams of

94. Id.
95. Tom Dart, Arizona Inmate Joseph Wood Was Injected 15 Times with
Execution Drugs, GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2014, 10:40 AM), http://www.the
guardian.com/world/2014/aug/02/arizona-inmate-injected-15-times-executiondrugs-joseph-wood.
96. Katie Fretland, Scene at Botched Oklahoma Execution of Clayton
Lockett Was ‘a Bloody Mess’, GUARDIAN (Dec. 13, 2014, 11:04 AM), http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/13/botched-oklahoma-executionclayton-lockett-bloody-mess.
97. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2782 (2015) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Id. at 2734 (majority opinion) (quoting Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d
721, 725 (10th Cir. 2015)).
99. Id. at 2782.
100. Id. at 2734.
101. Alan Johnson, Dennis McGuire’s Execution Was Not ‘Humane,’
Doctor Says, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Aug. 13, 2014, 7:19 AM), http://www.
dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2014/08/12/inmate-suffered-pain-duringexecution-doctor-says.html.
102. Id.
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midazolam and forty milligrams of hydromorphone.103
Dr.
Diveley commented that an anesthesiologist “would not depend on
a 10 mg dose of midazolam to provide for total loss of memory, or
to produce an unconscious state.”104 Dr. Diveley further noted
that during the execution, McGuire was “straining against his
restraints, struggling to breathe, and making hand gestures” and
that such actions signified consciousness.105
Dr. Diveley
ultimately concluded that McGuire’s death “was not a humane
execution,” and urged Ohio to consider other drug
combinations.106
IV. GLOSSIP V. GROSS

A. Lower Court Decision
Charles Warner, Richard Glossip, John Grant, and Benjamin
Cole were all sentenced to death by jury in Oklahoma for heinous
crimes.107 John Grant, while imprisoned, stabbed to death a food
service worker at his prison.108 Richard Glossip, the manager of a
motel, hired one of his employees to kill the motel’s owner with a
baseball bat.109
Charles Warner raped and murdered the
daughter of his girlfriend, an eleven-month-old child.110 Lastly,
Benjamin Cole snapped the spine of his nine-month-old daughter
in half.111
103. KENT DIVELEY, DIVELEY MED. CORP., MEDICAL REPORT ¶ 6 (Aug. 4,
2014), http://www.otse.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/2014-08-12-Dr.-Report
.pdf.
104. Id. ¶ 7.
105. Id. ¶ 9.
106. Id. ¶¶ 9–11.
107. See Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721, 723–24 (10th Cir. 2015), aff’d,
Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).
108. See Grant v. State, 58 P.3d 783, 789 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002),
judgment vacated, Grant v. Oklahoma, 540 U.S. 801 (2003), and overruled by
Jones v. State, 134 P.3d 150 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006); see also Warner, 776
F.3d at 724.
109. See Glossip v. State, 157 P.3d 143, 147–48 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007),
stay of execution denied by Glossip v. Oklahoma, 136 S. Ct. 26 (2015) (mem.);
see also Warner, 776 F.3d at 724.
110. See Warner v. State, 144 P.3d 838, 856 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006), stay
of execution denied by Warner v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 824 (2015) (mem.); see also
Warner, 776 F.3d at 724.
111. See Cole v. State, 164 P.3d 1089, 1092 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007), stay
of execution granted by Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 1197 (2015) (mem.); see
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At the time of their impending execution, Oklahoma was
using the same drug combination as was used in Clayton Lockett’s
execution, except with a higher dosage of midazolam.112
According to the protocol, the Director of Oklahoma’s Department
of Corrections had the sole discretion to choose from four
alternative drug doses and combinations that could be used in a
lethal injection procedure.113 For the four inmates, the Director
chose the fourth method, consisting of 500 milligrams of
midazolam, 100 milligrams of vecoronium bromide, and 240
milliequivalents of potassium chloride.114
In light of Lockett’s execution, the death row inmates
challenged Oklahoma’s use of midazolam, arguing that the drug
would not render them unconscious but rather leave them
vulnerable to the burning effects that the second and third drugs
would produce.115 They also argued that the procedure and drugs
used in Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocols were not
scientifically sound and their use would be an attempt at
nonconsensual human experimentation.116
The inmates
requested a preliminary injunction from the United States District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma.117 The district court
held a three-day evidentiary hearing and ultimately denied the
motion, concluding that the petitioners had not established the
requisite likelihood of success on the merits required to obtain a
preliminary injunction.118
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the inmates argued that the
district court erred in determining that Oklahoma’s three-drug
cocktail was substantially similar to the drugs upheld in Baze, and
as such, the court below had applied an incorrect standard—one
which required proof of an alternative execution method.119 The
also Warner, 776 F.3d at 724.
112. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2782 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
113. Warner, 776 F.3d at 726.
114. Id. Midazolam is supposed to induce unconsciousness while the
second drug paralyzes the inmate, who will go into cardiac arrest with the
administration of the third drug. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2732, 2734
(majority opinion).
115. See Warner, 776 F.3d at 726–27; see also Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2780–
81 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
116. See Warner, 776 F.3d at 727.
117. See id. at 723–24.
118. Id. at 727.
119. See id. at 731. The plaintiffs also argued that the district court
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Tenth Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court’s denial of the
motion, concluding that it was bound by its decision in Pavatt v.
Jones—a decision that relied on the alleged plurality standard
announced in Baze.120 In Pavatt, the Tenth Circuit found that
expert testimony regarding the effectiveness of pentobarbital
coupled with the sufficiency of Oklahoma’s procedures did not
present an unconstitutional threat of harm under Baze, which
required proof of a substantial risk of pain.121 Accordingly, the
district court in Warner v. Gross relied on expert testimony122 to
verify that 500 milligrams of midazolam would render a person
unconscious and insensate to pain.123
B. Petition to the United States Supreme Court
The four death row prisoners then filed a petition for writ of
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, alleging that
midazolam is incapable of rendering a person insensate to pain.124
Without achieving a deep level of unconsciousness, the inmates
repeated their argument that they would be subject to cruel and
unusual punishment by the administration of the second and
failed to consider the “evolving standards of decency.” See id.
120. See id. at 732; see also Pavatt v. Jones, 627 F.3d 1336, 1339 (10th
Cir. 2010).
121. See Pavatt, 627 F.3d at 1339. Specifically, the Tenth Circuit agreed
with the district court that “[a] stay of execution may not be granted on [such]
grounds . . . unless the condemned prisoner establishes that the State’s lethal
injection protocol creates a demonstrated risk of severe pain . . . [and] that
the risk is substantial when compared to the known and available
alternatives.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35,
61 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
122. At the three-day evidentiary hearing, the expert for the state, Dr.
Roswell Evans, claimed that “a 500-milligram dose of midazolam would
render the person unconscious and insensate during the remainder of the
[execution] procedure.” Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2784 (2015)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Conversely, the expert for the plaintiffs, Dr. David Lubarsky, relied
on evidence showing that “[m]idazolam cannot be used alone . . . to maintain
adequate anesthesia.”
Id. (quoting JG Reves et al., Midazolam:
Pharmacology and Uses, 62 ANESTHESIOLOGY 310, 318 (1985)).
123. The district court relied on three specific elements of Oklahoma’s
protocol, specifically: (1) the requirement of having two IV sites, (2) the
monitoring of inmates’ consciousness throughout the procedure, and (3) the
confirmation of IV viability. See Warner, 776 F.3d at 729–30.
124. See Brief for Petitioners at 2–3, Glossip, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (No. 147955); see also Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2731 (majority opinion).
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third drugs, which, due to a severe burning effect, would result in
their painful deaths.125 The Supreme Court initially denied a stay
of execution on January 15, 2015, and, later that same evening,
petitioner Charles Warner was executed with a drug sequence
that included midazolam.126 Warner’s last words were “my body
is on fire.”127
On January 23, 2015, just over a week after Warner’s
execution, the Supreme Court granted certiorari for the remaining
three petitioners to address the following issues:128
(1) Is it constitutionally permissible for a state to carry
out an execution using a three-drug protocol where:
(a) there is a well-established scientific consensus
that the first drug has no pain relieving properties
and cannot reliably produce deep, coma-like
unconsciousness, and
(b) it is undisputed that there is a substantial,
constitutionally unacceptable risk of pain and
suffering from the administration of the second and
third drugs when a prisoner is conscious?
(2) Does the Baze-plurality stay standard apply when
states are not using a protocol substantially similar to the
one that this Court considered in Baze?
(3) Must a prisoner establish the availability of an
alternative drug formula even if the state’s lethal
injection protocol, as properly administered, will violate
the Eighth Amendment?129
In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court rejected the petitioners’
arguments and found that they failed to meet their burden under
the standard set forth in Baze.130 Justice Alito authored the
majority opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy. Justice Breyer, joined by
125. See id. at 2.
126. See id. at 21–22, 25.
127. See id. at 22.
128. Id. at 25. Respondent’s application for stays were subsequently
granted on January 28, 2015. Id.
129. Id. at i.
130. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2730–31 (2015).
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Justice Ginsberg, wrote a dissenting opinion.131
Justice
Sotomayor also wrote a dissenting opinion, which Justices Breyer,
Ginsberg, and Kagan joined.132
C. The Majority’s Unattainable Standard and Justice
Sotomayor’s Response
In finding for the respondent, Justice Alito began the majority
opinion with the assumption that, “because it is settled that
capital punishment is constitutional, ‘[i]t necessarily follows that
there must be a [constitutional] means of carrying it out.’”133 On
that premise, the Court affirmed petitioner’s death sentences,
mainly for the following two reasons: (1) petitioners failed to prove
that midazolam presented a substantial risk of pain as required
by Baze, and (2) petitioners did not establish that the district
court committed clear error in finding that midazolam will not
cause severe pain.134
1.

The Battle of Persuasion

The Glossip Court affirmed the district court’s decision
because it found that (1) petitioners failed to prove that
“midazolam is sure or very likely to result in needless suffering,”
and that there was a “substantial risk of severe pain,” and (2)
numerous courts had found midazolam sufficient to render a
person insensate.135
In analyzing the expert testimony from both sides, the Court
commented on how Dr. Lubarsky, petitioner’s expert witness, was
unable to rebut the respondent’s expert witness statement that
500 milligrams of midazolam would render a person sufficiently
unconscious in the presence of the second and third drugs.136 The
Court concluded that “petitioners’ own experts effectively
conceded that they lacked evidence to prove their case beyond
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2732–33 (alterations in original) (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553
U.S. 35, 47 (2008)).
134. Id. at 2731.
135. Id. at 2739–40.
136. Id. at 2741. Dr. Lubarsky stated, “there is no scientific literature
addressing the use of midazolam as a manner to administer lethal injections
in humans.” See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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dispute.”137 Ultimately, “the fact that a low dose of midazolam is
not the best drug for maintaining unconsciousness during surgery
says little about whether a 500-milligram dose of midazolam is
constitutionally adequate for purposes of conducting an
execution.”138
In response to the majority’s finding that midazolam is
constitutionally adequate, Justice Sotomayor focused her dissent
on the drug’s purported ceiling effect.139 Having noted the
disputed testimony of experts on both sides, the dissent argued
that the district court erred in finding that 500 milligrams of
midazolam would render a person insensate to pain.140
Furthermore, the dissent pointed out that the respondent’s expert,
Dr. Evans, did not rely on scientific literature, but instead used
less reliable sources, such as www.drugs.com.141 The dissent also
believed that petitioners’ experts rebutted any purported evidence
from Dr. Evans by offering evidence that midazolam’s ceiling
effect is not limited to the person’s spinal cord, but also affects the
brain, which prevents a deeper level of unconsciousness from
occurring irrespective of the increased dosage.142
Justice
Sotomayor recognized that such scientific testimony might
sometimes be outside of a court’s area of expertise, but
“[e]specially when important constitutional rights are at stake,
federal district courts must carefully evaluate the premises and
evidence on which scientific conclusions are based, and appellate
courts must ensure that the courts below have in fact carefully
considered all the evidence presented.”143
The majority, however, found Oklahoma’s procedures and
safeguards when monitoring the prisoner’s level of consciousness
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2742. Justice Sotomayor’s dissent argues that Lockett and
Wood’s executions are proof that midazolam cannot maintain
unconsciousness. See id. at 2790 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). She further
noted that Wood was given 750 milligrams of midazolam but still “gasped
and snorted for nearly two hours.” Id. at 2791.
139. Id. at 2783–84.
140. Id. at 2786.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2786–87.
143. Id. at 2786. Justice Breyer also noted in his dissent that “the
Constitution insists that ‘every safeguard’ be ‘observed’ when ‘a defendant’s
life is a stake.’” Id. at 2764 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Greg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976)).
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to be adequate in preventing any constitutional violations,
including a death row inmate’s awareness, via the administration
of the second and third drugs.144
2.

Known and Available Methods of Execution

Acknowledging the recent difficulties to obtain the drugs used
in the Baze-approved protocol, the majority still insisted that
petitioners must provide the Court with a known and available
alternative to midazolam.145 Justice Sotomayor responded in her
dissent that “Baze held no such thing.”146 She then distinguished
the petitioner’s claim in Baze from petitioner’s claim in Glossip:
In Baze, the very premise of the petitioners’ Eighth
Amendment claim was that they had “identified a
significant risk of harm [in Kentucky’s protocol] that
[could] be eliminated by adopting alternative
procedures.” . . . Thus, the “grounds . . . asserted” for
relief in Baze were that the State’s protocol was
intolerably risky given the alternative procedures the
State could have employed.147
Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority contradicted Hill
v. McDonough, where the Court held that identifying an
“alternative, authorized method of execution” was not required
when challenging a state’s execution protocol.148 She asserted
144. Id. at 2742 (majority opinion). Justice Alito wrote, “many other
safeguards that Oklahoma has adopted mirror those that the dissent in Baze
complained were absent from Kentucky’s protocol in that case.” Id.
145. Id. at 2738–39. Baze held that “the Eighth Amendment requires a
prisoner to plead and prove a known and available alternative” to a
challenged procedure, which petitioners failed to do. See id. at 2739.
“Petitioners do not seriously contest this factual finding [(that sodium
thiopental and pentobarbital are not available to Oklahoma)], and they have
not identified any available drug or drugs that could be used in place of those
that Oklahoma is now unable to obtain.” Id. at 2738.
146. Id. at 2793 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). “Simply stated, the ‘Eighth
Amendment categorically prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishments.’ . . . The Court today, however, would convert this categorical
prohibition into a conditional one.” Id. (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302, 330 (1989)).
147. Id. at 2794 (alterations in original) (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S.
35, 51 (2008)).
148. Id. (quoting Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 582 (2006)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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that because the Court in Hill did not require proof of an
alternative method as a requirement in order to bring a successful
Eighth Amendment claim, holding otherwise would be contrary to
the Court’s precedent.149 The dissent also found it “odd to punish
[petitioners] for the actions of pharmaceutical companies and
others who seek to disassociate themselves from the death
penalty” because the result of the drug shortage is that petitioners
were unable to source an alternative to midazolam to meet the
Court’s requirement.150
Furthermore, not only did Justice Sotomayor find that the
majority opinion contradicted Hill, but she argued that it also
relied on a holding in Baze that did not exist.151 As discussed
previously, it was uncertain what the Baze Court held because
Justice Thomas’ concurrence, joined by Justice Scalia, disagreed
with the substantial risk analysis proffered in the judgment—the
same analysis that also included the need for an alternative
method.152 Even if a majority of the Court had agreed to that
standard, the standard never required that every challenge
undergo the same analysis since the challenge in Baze was
different from the challenge in Glossip.153
Justice Sotomayor also mentioned that this new requirement
of an alternative method could become “an invitation to propose
methods of execution less consistent with modern sensibilities.”154
Specifically, the dissent discussed how reverting back to use of the
firing squad “could be seen as a devolution to a more primitive
era,” which she sees as a “step in the opposite direction,” and
possibly unconstitutional under an evolving standard of
decency.155 However, an inmate may find that “such visible yet
149. Id. at 2794–95, 2797.
150. Id. at 2796.
151. Id. at 2793–94.
152. Id. at 2793. “Because the position that a plaintiff challenging a
method of execution under the Eighth Amendment must prove the
availability of an alternative means of execution did not ‘represent the views
of a majority of the Court,’ it was not the holding of the Baze Court.” Id.
(quoting CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 81 (1987)).
153. Id. at 2794.
154. Id. at 2796.
155. Id. at 2796–97. Dissenting from a Ninth Circuit refusal to rehear a
case resulting in a death sentence, Chief Judge Alex Kozinski wrote:
The guillotine is probably [the best method] but seems inconsistent
with our national ethos. And the electric chair, hanging and the gas
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relatively painless violence may be vastly preferable to an
excruciatingly painful death hidden behind a veneer of
medication.”156 Lastly, in response to the majority’s conclusion
that, because execution is constitutional, there must be a
constitutional method of execution, the dissent argued that the
execution methods that are “‘barbarous,’ or ‘involve[] torture or a
lingering death,’ do[] not become less so because it is the only
method currently available to a State.”157
D. Glossip Conclusion and Analysis
Even if Baze did not hold that a petitioner must provide a
known and available alternative in order to prove that a current
method presents a substantial risk of pain, it is clear that the
Glossip majority did. Now, death row inmates must enter into a
battle of persuasion with the Court—not to prove that their death
is unconstitutional—but, rather, to prove the most effective
method for their execution. Setting the issues of the Court’s
reliance on faulty precedent aside, how does this standard make
sense in today’s society?
It is undisputed that past execution drugs have been withheld
by their own manufacturers solely because the companies do not
wish to be associated with the death penalty.158 It is also
undisputed that government-funded human experimentation is
prohibited.159 This begs the question: What exactly is a petitioner

chamber are each subject to occasional mishaps. The firing squad
strikes me as the most promising. Eight or ten large-caliber rifle
bullets fired at close range can inflict massive damage, causing
instant death every time. There are plenty of people employed by
the state who can pull the trigger and have the training to aim true.
Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1076, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014) (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 21 (2014) (mem.). Chief Judge Kozinski
seems to suggest that the best way to ensure that a method will not cause
cruel and unusual punishment is through certainty. Id. That is, a procedure
that is successful and will not cause the inmate additional suffering. Id.
156. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2797 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 2795 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345 (1981));
In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)).
158. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2796.
159. Information on Protection of Human Subjects in Research Funded or
Regulated by U.S. Government, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://
www.hhs.gov/1946inoculationstudy/protection.html (last visited Feb. 29,
2016).
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supposed to do in the face of a controversial execution protocol? If
he or she cannot somehow convince the manufacturers to
distribute, or alternatively test, new drugs for their ability to
obtain and maintain consciousness, then it is clear that the
petitioner has no recourse in the courts as the standard is written.
Is this really what the Glossip Court intended?
V. OVERARCHING ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY

The Glossip majority did not intend to start a conversation as
to whether the death penalty is per se unconstitutional: Justice
Alito was clear that, “because it is settled that capital punishment
is constitutional, ‘[i]t necessarily follows that there must be a
[constitutional] means of carrying it out.’”160 However, both
dissents in Glossip and a subsequent case in Connecticut proved
that, while Justice Alito did not intend to spark the conversation,
the dialogue has indeed begun.
A. Justice Breyer’s Dissent in Glossip
In his Glossip dissent, Justice Breyer questioned the
constitutionality of the death penalty.161 He claimed that there
are certain “constitutional defects,” such as “(1) serious
unreliability, (2) arbitrariness in application, . . . (3)
unconscionably long delays that undermine the death penalty’s
penological purpose,” and finally “(4) most places within the
United States have abandoned its use.”162
Justice Breyer argued that excessive delays while on death
row are cruel.163 In comparison to 1960, where the average delay
from the sentencing to the actual execution was two years, the
average delay for a prisoner is now approximately eighteen
years.164 In light of this observation, the dissent argues that
160. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2732–33 (majority opinion) (alterations in
original) (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47 (2008)).
161. Id. at 2755 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 2756. Chief Judge Kozinski from the Ninth Circuit once wrote:
“The death penalty, as we now administer it, has no deterrent value because
it is imposed so infrequently and so freakishly. To get executed in America
these days you have to be not only a truly nasty person, but also very, very
unlucky.” Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On
Sentence, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 25 (1995).
163. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2764.
164. Id.
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“unless we abandon the procedural requirements that assure
fairness and reliability, we are forced to confront the problem of
increasingly lengthy delays in capital cases. Ultimately, though
these legal causes may help to explain, they do not mitigate the
harms caused by delay itself.”165 Furthermore, Justice Breyer
stated that “[a] death penalty system that seeks procedural
fairness and reliability brings with it delays that severely
aggravate the cruelty of capital punishment and significantly
undermine the rationale for imposing a sentence of death in the
first place.”166 Lastly, the dissent used the decline in executions
as evidence to support the theory that the punishment itself is
“unusual,” as it shows consistent change among the states.167
B. Decline in Connecticut
On August 25, 2012, the Connecticut legislature repealed the
death penalty prospectively.168 Exactly three years later, the
Connecticut Supreme Court, in State v. Santiago, held that the
repeal applied retroactively to those still on death row because the
“state’s death penalty no longer comports with contemporary
standards of decency and no longer serves any legitimate
penological purpose.”169
The Connecticut Supreme Court
ultimately found, like Justice Breyer in his Glossip dissent, that
lengthy delays170 and the historical development of the death
penalty171 among other considerations, created profound issues for

165. Id. Justice Breyer also argued that lengthy delays are cruel because
confinement on death row itself is dehumanizing. Id. at 2765.
166. Id. at 2772.
167. Id. at 2772–74 (noting that only seven states executed inmates in
2014).
168. An Act Revising the Penalty for Capital Felonies, Pub. Act 12-5, 2012
Conn. Acts (Reg. Sess. 2012).
169. 122 A.3d 1, 10 (Conn. 2015).
170. “The man you wanted to kill was the abusive robber, high on crack,
who pistol-whipped and shot two customers . . . in 1984. Instead, in 1990, the
state electrocutes a balding, religious, model prisoner in a neat blue-denim
uniform.” Id. at 63 (quoting Samuel R. Gross, The Romance of Revenge:
Capital Punishment in America, 13 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 71, 82 (1993))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
171. The court found that the historical development of the death penalty
shows that the state had only carried out only one execution in the past fiftyfive years noting that the inmate “all but forced the state to carry out his
sentence.” Id. at 38.
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a modern society.172 The dissent in Santiago argued that the
majority used an improper analysis and violated the separation of
powers in concluding that the state’s repeal on the death penalty
should apply retroactively; specifically, the legislature, in
repealing the death penalty prospectively, did not intend for a
retroactive repeal unless it had provided such.173
CONCLUSION

While larger questions about the constitutionality of the
death penalty exist, this Comment contemplates only the crucial
questions and concerns stemming from the Court’s decision in
Glossip. Is the Court truly requiring petitioners to choose their
own execution methods knowing full well that effective drugs are
no longer on the market? Could the Court be suggesting that
petitioners look to past methods, which could be seen as
devolution of our society’s modern view of capital punishment?
Or, worse, must those petitioners attempt to test a new method on
their own to determine how much pain it could cause when
compared to the current method?
If so, then the Court is making it seemingly impossible for
petitioners to challenge their death sentences on the basis of a
substantial risk of pain. A petitioner’s burden of persuasion is
now practically insurmountable in light of the scarcity of several
drugs. Psychologically, the burden of persuasion also rises to a
level of cruelty when one imagines the circumstances where
petitioners are researching how a state can best kill him or her
with the least risk of pain. This burden—both emotional and
legal—should not be on a petitioner. If a state wants to sentence
its citizens to death, the burden should fall on the state to execute
its citizens in way that comports with society’s standard of
decency.

172.
173.

See id.
Id. at 137 (Rogers, C.J., dissenting).

